


Governor Svein Gjedrem

The Norwegian Savings Banks Association's Annual Meeting, Stavanger 22 October 2009

%NB≫ NORGES BANK




" The greatest risk lay in the fact that this anxiety had now become pervasive. The very foundations of confidence, the nation's confidence in its own credit institutions had been shaken ... The most important objective was therefore to prevent an avalanche, seek to contain the damage, hang on and hold back. That was the dominant thought, to prevent total collapse, for the danger of this was indeed present... and the general atmosphere of nervousness manifested itself in the most peculiar ways. In the blind panic that ensued, attacks were made on institutions that were more than deserving of their depositors' confidence."


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" In the context of the current crisis the surprise was **not** the decline in real estate prices or the fact that subprime mortgages were the first to be affected by this decline. Rather, the surprise was in the distress of many parts of the financial system, even those very distant from the subprime market itself, including all structured products, commercial paper, and interbank lending. At a moment's notice, linkages became too complex and hard to understand, ... and panic ensued."


Ricardo J. Caballero og Pablo Kurlat


NBS NORGE

















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



	Macroprudential	Microprudential
Proximate objective	Limit financial system- wide distress	Limit distress of individual institutions
Ultimate objective	Avoid output (GDP) costs linked to financial instability	Consumer (investor/depositor) protection
Correlations and common exposures across institutions	Important	Irrelevant

6









8

