Lending is often associated with significant asymmetric information issues between suppliers of funds and their potential borrowers. Banks can screen their borrowers, or can require them to post collateral in order to ...

Information sharing and collateral reduce adverse selection costs, but are costly for lenders. When a bank learns more about the types of its rival's borrowers through information sharing (e.g., credit bureaus), it might ...

We examine the conditions required for the existence of private credit bureaus, their ownership and coverage. Our model implies that bank consortia will most likely be preferred by banks, but that they will lead to restricted ...

We show how a regulatory disclosure of hidden debt can eliminate a large mispricing in housing. In a setting where homebuyers must combine several sources of debt, they are biased towards hidden loans, especially if they ...

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking using a unique dataset covering the population of corporate borrowers in Norway. We find that a lower benchmark interest rate (interbank rates or overnight ...