Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorHolden, Steinar
dc.contributor.authorNatvik, Gisle James
dc.contributor.authorVigier, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-02T13:46:24Z
dc.date.available2018-05-02T13:46:24Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-7553-711-7
dc.identifier.issn1502-8143
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2496816
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of credit rating agencies (CRAs) based on reputation concerns. Ratings affect investors' choice and, thereby, also issuers' access to funding and default risk. We show that - in equilibrium - the informational content of credit ratings is inferior to that of CRAs' private information. We find that CRAs have a pro-cyclical impact on default risk: in a liquidity boom CRAs help resolve investors' coordination problem, and lower the probability of default; in a liquidity crunch CRAs raise the probability of default. Furthermore, rating standards tend to be pro-cyclical, while biased CRA-incentives will ultimately be self-defeating.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorges Banknb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers;23/2012
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectJEL: G24nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL: G33nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL: D82nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL: C72nb_NO
dc.subjectCRAnb_NO
dc.subjectcredit rating agenciesnb_NO
dc.subjectglobal gamesnb_NO
dc.subjectcoordination failurenb_NO
dc.titleAn Equilibrium Model of Credit Rating Agenciesnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber31nb_NO


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
Med mindre annet er angitt, så er denne innførselen lisensiert som Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal