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dc.contributor.authorHvide, Hans K.
dc.contributor.authorKristiansen, Eirik Gaard
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-06T08:50:19Z
dc.date.available2018-06-06T08:50:19Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2500527
dc.description.abstractWe study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to our understanding of such diverse phenomena as promotion processes in firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorges Banknb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers;2/1999
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectJEL: C44nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL: D29nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL: D83nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL: J41nb_NO
dc.subjectcontestnb_NO
dc.subjectrisk takingnb_NO
dc.subjectselectionnb_NO
dc.subjecttournamentnb_NO
dc.titleRisk Taking in Selection Contestsnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber23nb_NO


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
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