• Collateral and Repeated Lending 

      Karapetyan, Artashes; Stacescu, Bogdan (Working Papers;18/2012, Working paper, 2012)
      Lending is often associated with significant asymmetric information issues between suppliers of funds and their potential borrowers. Banks can screen their borrowers, or can require them to post collateral in order to ...
    • Does Information Sharing Reduce the Role of Collateral as a Screening Device? 

      Karapetyan, Artashes; Stacescu, Bogdan (Working Papers;19/2012, Working paper, 2012)
      Information sharing and collateral reduce adverse selection costs, but are costly for lenders. When a bank learns more about the types of its rival's borrowers through information sharing (e.g., credit bureaus), it might ...
    • Information Sharing and Information Acquisition in Credit Markets 

      Karapetyan, Artashes; Stacescu, Bogdan (Working Papers;24/2010, Working paper, 2010)
      Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may seem that the establishment of information sharing (e.g., introducing credit bureaus or public registers) will lead to lower ...
    • Information Sharing and Information Acquisition: Ownership and Coverage 

      Karapetyan, Artashes; Stacescu, Bogdan (Working Papers;23/2011, Working paper, 2011)
      We examine the conditions required for the existence of private credit bureaus, their ownership and coverage. Our model implies that bank consortia will most likely be preferred by banks, but that they will lead to restricted ...