Blar i Norges Banks vitenarkiv på emneord "political economy"

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    • Persistent Inefficient Redistribution 

      Claussen, Carl Andreas (Working Papers;11/2002, Working paper, 2002)
      Why do governments redistribute through indirect and inefficient means? An intuitive hypothesis is that it masks the real aim and cost of policy. In this paper we construct a dynamic model with an infinite horizon, political ...

    • Petro Populism 

      Matsen, Egil; Natvik, Gisle James; Torvik, Ragnar (Working Papers;6/2012, Working paper, 2012)
      We aim to explain petro populism - the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a purely rent-seeking ...