dc.contributor.author | Claussen, Carl Andreas | |
dc.contributor.author | Røisland, Øistein | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-08T07:23:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-08T07:23:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-82-7553-551-9 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1502-8143 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2497458 | |
dc.description.abstract | The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non-monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Norges Bank | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers;5/2010 | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy | nb_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 32 | nb_NO |