dc.contributor.author | Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-16T12:46:15Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-16T12:46:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 82-7553-324-4 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 82-7553-325-2 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0801-2504 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1502-8143 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2498427 | |
dc.description.abstract | Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves credit allocation, but creates informational lock-in effects in bank-borrower relationships. In a competitive credit market, banks dissipate anticipated profit from serving locked-in borrowers subsequently revealed to the bank as good to attract new borrowers with unknown credit quality. Consequently, banks’ lending strategies result in cross-subsidies from good to bad borrowers. We investigate how firms’ choice of debt structure interacts with the cross-subsidies inherent in banks’ lending strategies. The analysis sheds light on how dynamic bank competition determines monitoring intensity, seniority, and maturity structure in bank dependent industries. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Norges Bank | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers;10/2005 | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.subject | JEL: D82 | nb_NO |
dc.subject | JEL: G32 | nb_NO |
dc.subject | JEL: G21 | nb_NO |
dc.subject | JEL: L14 | nb_NO |
dc.subject | corporate debt structure | nb_NO |
dc.subject | bank lending | nb_NO |
dc.subject | lock-in effects | nb_NO |
dc.title | Strategic Bank Monitoring and Firms’ Debt Structure | nb_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 35 | nb_NO |