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Persistent Inefficient Redistribution

dc.contributor.authorClaussen, Carl Andreas
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-22T08:50:17Z
dc.date.available2018-05-22T08:50:17Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.isbn82-7553-202-7
dc.identifier.issn0801-2504
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2498652
dc.description.abstractWhy do governments redistribute through indirect and inefficient means? An intuitive hypothesis is that it masks the real aim and cost of policy. In this paper we construct a dynamic model with an infinite horizon, political competition, rational individuals and asymmetric information regarding the efficiency of policy and politicians’ preferences to test this hypothesis. While the previous (formal) literature explains one-time projects like the building of a dam, bridge or an airport, we are able to explain the persistent use of inefficient means like regulation and subsidies for redistributive purposes.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorges Banknb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers;11/2002
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectJEL: D72nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL: C73nb_NO
dc.subjectpolitical economynb_NO
dc.subjectinefficient redistributionnb_NO
dc.subjectreformnb_NO
dc.subjectspecial interestsnb_NO
dc.titlePersistent Inefficient Redistributionnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber16nb_NO


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
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