dc.contributor.author | Holden, Steinar | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-05T12:24:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-06-05T12:24:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 82-7553-157-8 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0801-2504 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2500413 | |
dc.description.abstract | International comparisons show that countries with co-ordinated wage setting generally have lower unemployment than countries with less co-ordinated wage setting. This paper argues that the monetary regime may affect whether co-ordination among many wage setters is feasible. A strict monetary regime, like a country-specific inflation target, to some extent disciplines wage setters, so that the consequences of uncoordinated wage setting are less detrimental than under a more passive monetary regime (eg a monetary union). Thus, the gains from co-ordination are larger under a passive regime. Under some circumstances a passive regime may induce co-operation in wage setting, and thus lower unemployment, when a stricter regime would not. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Norges Bank | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers;1/2000 | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.subject | JEL: E24 | nb_NO |
dc.subject | JEL: J5 | nb_NO |
dc.subject | JEL: E52 | nb_NO |
dc.subject | wage setting | nb_NO |
dc.subject | co-ordination | nb_NO |
dc.subject | equilibrium unemployment | nb_NO |
dc.subject | monetary regime | nb_NO |
dc.subject | monetary union | nb_NO |
dc.title | Monetary Regime and the Co-Ordination of Wage Setting | nb_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | updatedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 35 | nb_NO |