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dc.contributor.authorSøvik, Ylva
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-27T08:16:44Z
dc.date.available2020-05-27T08:16:44Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-8379-142-6
dc.identifier.issn1504-2596
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2655724
dc.description.abstractOne of the core functions of a central bank is to provide liquidity insurance, often termed the lender of last resort (LLR) function. During and after the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007-09 central banks’ role as liquidity insurers evolved. In the aftermath of the crisis, regulation of liquidity risk in the financial sector has been tightened, and central bank policies are under evaluation. This survey gathers insights from the literature on how to design central bank liquidity insuring policies: What institutions to insure, how to price central bank facilities, what collateral to accept, the size of operations, the degree to which they should be on-going facilities or contingent, and the interaction of our liquidity policies with regulation. Some fundamental trade-offs are identified and discussed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorges Banken_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStaff Memo;3/2020
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectliquidity insuranceen_US
dc.subjectlender of last resorten_US
dc.subjectfinancial crisisen_US
dc.subjectliquidity regulationen_US
dc.titleThe rationale for central bank liquidity insurance and liquidity regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en_US
dc.source.pagenumber24en_US


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
Med mindre annet er angitt, så er denne innførselen lisensiert som Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal