Risk Taking in Selection Contests

dc.contributor.author	Hvide, Hans K.
dc.contributor.author	Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
dc.date.accessioned	2018-06-06T08:50:19Z
dc.date.available	2018-06-06T08:50:19Z
dc.date.issued	1999
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2500527
dc.description.abstract	We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to our understanding of such diverse phenomena as promotion processes in firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.	nb_NO
dc.language.iso	eng	nb_NO
dc.publisher	Norges Bank	nb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working Papers;2/1999
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no	*
dc.subject	JEL: C44	nb_NO
dc.subject	JEL: D29	nb_NO
dc.subject	JEL: D83	nb_NO
dc.subject	JEL: J41	nb_NO
dc.subject	contest	nb_NO
dc.subject	risk taking	nb_NO
dc.subject	selection	nb_NO
dc.subject	tournament	nb_NO
dc.title	Risk Taking in Selection Contests	nb_NO
dc.type	Working paper	nb_NO
dc.description.version	publishedVersion	nb_NO
dc.subject.nsi	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212	nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber	23	nb_NO

Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal