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dc.contributor.authorMaih, Junior
dc.contributor.authorMazelis, Falk
dc.contributor.authorMotto, Roberto
dc.contributor.authorRistiniemi, Annukka
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-28T06:08:24Z
dc.date.available2021-09-28T06:08:24Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-8379-202-7
dc.identifier.issn1502-8190
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2783870
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the implications of asymmetric monetary policy rules by estimating Markovswitching DSGE models for the euro area (EA) and the US. The estimations show that until mid-2014 the ECB's response to inflation was more forceful when inflation was above 2% than below 2%. Since then, the ECB's policy can be characterised as symmetric, and we quantify the macroeconomic implications of this policy change. We uncover asymmetries also in the Fed's policy, which has responded more strongly in times of crisis. We compute an optimal simple rule for the EA and the US in an environment with the effective lower bound and a low neutral real rate, and find that it prescribes a stronger response to inflation and the output gap when inflation is below target compared to when it is above target. We document its stabilisation properties had this optimal rule been implemented over the last two decades.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorges Banken_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper;7/2021
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectinflation targetingen_US
dc.subjectoptimal monetary policyen_US
dc.subjecteffective lower bounden_US
dc.subjectBayesian estimationen_US
dc.subjectMarkov-switching DSGEen_US
dc.subjectJEL: E52en_US
dc.subjectJEL: E58en_US
dc.subjectJEL: E31en_US
dc.subjectJEL: E32en_US
dc.titleAsymmetric monetary policy rules for the euro area and the USen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en_US
dc.source.pagenumber36en_US


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
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